The Arab Exception, a Larry Diamond Study summmary.

The third wave of democratization made the concept of democracy truly global with 117 Democratic countries by 1995, a considerable increase from only 40 in 1974. Democracy managed to expand from the west and reach almost every geographical area with one exception, the Arab world. The Arab world is the exception that seems to be putting the true globalization of democracy in question. Many individuals have tried to find the reason for this anomaly, with many drawing links to Arab culture and religion. One of the many people working to solve this problem is Larry Diamond, political sociologist and leading contemporary scholar in the field of democracy studies, published an article in the Journal of Democracy entitled “Why are there no Arab Democracies?”. The main objective of his study is to find an answer to that exact question in the title. In this article, Larry Diamond takes a look into Arab culture, Muslim religion, oil wealth, authoritarianism, as well as geopolitics in order to see which has the biggest effect on hindering the creation of the Arab democracy.

When the data is studied, it shows that the “democracy gap” is more specifically an Arab gap rather than a Muslim gap. The study compares and contrasts 16 Arab countries that are Muslim majority with 29 non-Arab countries that are also Muslim majority. The study shows how there are countries like Albania, Bangladesh, and Malaysia that are non-Arab but still majority Muslim have extended democratic political rights to their citizens. When adjusting the data to take into account the level of political rights expected from their level of per capita income, multiple “electoral overachievers” are found among the 29 non-Arab countries and none amongst the 16 Arab ones. The Freedom House also has 8 non-Arab Muslim majority countries rated as democracies, while 0 Arab Muslim majority countries are rated as such. The non-Arab countries also have a better average in the Freedom house scale, 4.7 compared to that of Arab countries 5.53. It is due to this data that Larry Diamond believes that religion is not the real cause for the democratic deficit.

Another aspect that is looked at in the study is that of Arab culture, which shows a complex story. In five countries surveyed between 2003 and 2006 by the Arab Barometer, 40% to 45% of each public supported the establishment of a secular democracy while around the same percentage wanted an Islamic form of democracy. Around 56% believe that “men of religion” should have influence over government decisions, as well as more than half believing that government should implement nothing else but shari’a law. This evidence points to secular democracy proponents varying very little from their Islamic democracy peers, the main difference being secular democrats are more liberal when it comes to race and women rights. The complex story arises from the fact that these secular democrats fear that it won’t be a modest Islamic democracy, but instead a regime dominated by extremist factions like the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood or the Jordanian Islamic Front. This situation is parallel to the fear of radical left or communist movement in Latin America and South Africa, who are feared by authoritarians as well as their liberal opponents. Only after the dissipation of these far left or communist movement, the negotiation to a transition to democracy began. This parallel shows that a major step towards democratization of the Arab countries hinges on the dissipation of these extremist Islamic groups, the same way democratization in south America hinges in the dissipation of leftist extremists.

It is in fact the economic structure of oil wealth that may have the largest impact. 11 of the 16 Arab countries are “rentier” states that depend almost solely on oil and gas rents. Thanks to oil, these countries are rich enough that they don’t have to tax their citizens. This is a problem in the sense that it fails to develop the expectation of accountability that emerges from countries taxing their citizens. This was avoided by oil rich countries like Norway and England by having well developed systems of accountability and taxation before their oil wealth was developed. Oil states are extremely big and centralized since that wealth goes directly to the state. In these Arab oil wealthy states, the oil revenue pours directly into the countries coffers and is then treated as “free for the taking” since it’s technically no one’s money, and certainly no one’s tax money, or product of it. This creates a strong corruption culture amongst these governments while supporting bureaucratic job programs to buy political peace. Entrepreneurship is also almost nonexistent since most people in business work for the state oil sector through government contracts. With the 23 countries that derive most of their exports from oil not being democracies, this adds to the economic structural basis for the democratic deficit.

Another area looked at by the author is that The Arab states also use authoritarian practices like repression and limited “controlled” elections to keep control. These Arab states use their mukhabarat, the secret police and intelligence apparatus, to repress as much as possible. This is combined with limited controlled elections to create a cyclical system, a direct consequence of such system. When pressure starts to pile, the regime loosens restriction on political activities until political opponents gather enough power to become a threat, then the restrictions are tightened once more. The rules and system are designed to make regime opponents as disadvantage and weak as possible. Another consequence being the hard position the system puts oppositionists in. If they participate in the process, they’ll be seen as coopted by the electorate. If they do not participate, they are stuck with the “outside game” of protest and resistance, which offers little power.

The author also takes a look at 3 geopolitical factors that have a big impact in hindering Arab democracy, these being “Foreign aid”, “Arab-Israeli relations”, and “regional effects”. For the other 5 not oil rich Arab countries, foreign aid has the same effect as oil rents. This foreign aid goes straight into state coffers and are used to coopt and repress the citizens. Egypt has amassed around $78 billion from the U.S. since 1975. Jordan on the other hand gets $650 million every year since 2001. This foreign aid consists of 27% of all their domestic revenue. Arab-Israeli relations is another factor that impacts the democratization of the Arab world. Israel serves as the scapegoat for Arab countries, which divert all political frustrations away from their corruption and human rights violations to Israel. State media also likes to depict emotively Israel’s oppression of Palestine and drawing symbolic extensions to the rest of the Arab world. Regional effects are the third geopolitical factor playing a role in the democratic deficit. Arab states support one another in keeping authoritarian rule through monitoring, riggings, and repression. The Arab League that represents the 22 Arab nations has become an autocrat’s club, and its charter has erased any mention of democracy or individual rights. The fact that there is also no Arab democracy to emulate shows how well coordinated they are.

When concluding the study, Larry Diamond states that he doesn’t believe that the Arab world is forever condemned to authoritarian rule. He then proposes three ways in which the Arab world can make inroads and progress towards democracy. The first one is the necessity for an Arab democracy model, a democratic Arab country that can be a set example for the region. The second would be the restructure and reimplementation of more practical assistance to press for democratic reform, judicial independence, freedom of the press, as well as government transparency. The third and final would be the biggest game changer, and that would be the steep decline of oil prices. If oil prices go down, bigger Arab states like Algeria and Saudi Arabia would be forced to strike bargain and collaboration with its citizens. The author points out that climate change policies is likely to accelerate that process of lowering oil prices. Recent pushes for clean energy and self-sufficiency have pushed those prices down, but it might be climate change that brings regime change in the Arab world.